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Abstract 
An increasing global population and the threat of climate change influences the dynamics 
of security in international river basins.  States may suffer from water scarcity, 
hydropower scarcity, pollution from an upstream state or lack of flood control, causing 
them to exploit a shared international river. States sharing a common water source must 
successfully manage the shared resource to increase cooperation and security in the basin. 
Yet, states are inclined to pursue self-interested foreign policies when seeking to secure 
scarce resources. By maximizing their gains, states are able to sustain life and develop 
economically. However, when a state’s main source of freshwater comes from a shared 
river basin, it can no longer pursue its unilateral policies without affecting the other states 
that rely on the common resource. The threat of an international security problem 
increases when all co-riparian states pursue unilateral domestic policies without 
coordinating with their neighbors. The multipartite nature of transboundary rivers poses a 
challenge in managing internationally shared resources. Despite the inclination to pursue 
policies that would highly benefit domestic goals, states often reach a compromise to 
develop international river agreements. These agreements are key to mitigating conflict 
over shared freshwater resources and maintaining cooperation within the river basin. The 
institutional characteristics of an agreement can either enhance or detract from the 
success of the agreement. In environments characterized by uncertainty, it is essential to 
understand the commonalities in agreements that enhance cooperation. By increasing the 
awareness of what makes an agreement comparatively more successful, international 
relations scholars’ and policy makers’ understanding of the nature of the regimes will 
increase. This thesis argues that four particular institutional characteristics – flexibility, 
dispute mechanism, enforcement mechanism, and transparency – have a significant 
impact on security in international river basins. This thesis also argues that three external 
factors also have an effect on the success of the agreement in maintaining security in the 
basin. The creation of a river basin organization, including all co-riparian states in the 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Freshwater is a vital economic and environmental resource essential to a state’s 
development and human security. In recent decades, international relations scholars are 
more concerned with water security. Environmental changes, coupled with growing 
global population, places a greater strain on shared water resources. Approximately 40% 
of the world’s population lives in transboundary river basins (United Nations 
Development Programme 2006: 231). They rely on the rivers for livelihoods, drinking 
water and recreation. With a large portion of the world’s population vying for a finite 
resource, the likelihood of conflict over rivers increases within multiple sectors of 
society. Conflict can arise not only on the international level between states, but also 
between local farmers or municipalities within countries. States seek to maximize their 
share of the resource and make unilateral decisions to further domestic policies. As each 
riparian state pursues domestic policies in its own self-interest, the shared resource 
cannot be sustainably managed in terms of the collective good. The egotistical, selfish 
nature of states complicates managing shared resources.  
The anarchy of the international system further complicates negotiating 
international agreements. States have not accepted an overarching international law, to 
date. One of the main obstacles in river resource management is the absence of a 
universal international treaty. The United Nations put forth the Law of the Non-
Navigational Uses of International Watercourses in 1997 for ratification. However, too 
few states approved the treaty. Despite the lack of an overarching, encompassing 
international treaty, riparian states have undertaken negotiations in the vast majority of 
river basins globally. States possess a large amount of flexibility in international 
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watercourse law because there is no universal codification to which they must adhere. 
Nevertheless, the UN Convention has served as a general framework for self-organization 
in river basins. Since 1945, riparian states have signed over 200 treaties managing 
internationally shared rivers (Giordano and Wolf 2003: 163). 
Cooperation over international rivers has long preceded modern organizations. 
The first international water agreement dates back to a treaty between the Mesopotamian 
city state of Umma and Lagash in 3100 BC. The first international water management 
organization was established in 1815 to govern navigation of the Rhine River 
(Dombrowsky 2007: 118). Despite the long history of early cooperation, international 
river agreements and organizations are a relatively new concept. The number of 
transboundary river agreements and organizations greatly increased after World War II. 
Moreover, the scope and scale of the agreements expanded, covering a wider range of 
issues resulting from concerns over climate change, growing populations, 
industrialization, water quantity and water quality. River agreements in the twentieth 
century broke away from the traditional focus on navigation and covered new uses, such 
as pollution control, hydropower generation, and flood management and control. 
According to the Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database, 109 out of the 263 
existing international river basins implemented international water agreements.  Of the 
109 basins with agreements, 63 have international river organizations in place – 
approximately a quarter of international river basins worldwide. 
Institutions are essential to water resource management because conflicts – which 
will inevitably occur – between riparian states can be referred to the institution, thus 
deterring any potential military or economic conflict. While it is important to understand 
	  
	   6	  
why states engage in conflict and why they cooperate, it is also important to understand 
what makes an institution successful in mitigating disputes that will inevitably arise. As 
riparian states establish an increasing number of river basin organizations (RBO)1, there 
is a need to pay greater attention to the design of the institution. Only then, can political 
scientists and policymakers understand the factors that inhibit or promote the 
effectiveness of institutions in managing international river basins. 
Much of the literature surrounding international rivers debates the wider resource 
scarcity and the water wars rationale. A popular theory maintains that increasing 
competition for scare resources will lead to armed conflict (Alam 2002: 341). 
Nevertheless, quantitative analysis in the field demonstrates that cooperation greatly 
outweighs armed conflict amongst riparian states (Brochmann 2012). Cooperation is 
likely to endure between riparian states once a treaty has been signed. Brochmann 
demonstrates that peaceful cooperation between riparians is generally maintained after 
the establishment of formal institutions (2012: 144-5).  
International river management presents a complex area for international 
cooperation. Managing a shared resource that is vital to all areas of survival becomes a 
challenge when all parties involved seek to maximize their gains. The way countries 
utilize the water may conflict. For example, an upstream state may be constructing a dam, 
while a downstream state has been increasing irrigation for farm use. Both states need to 
increase their water consumption for their respective projects; however, the water supply 
has not increased. Without communication, the two neighbors are stressing the resource 
and in turn relations between the states. Nevertheless, an overwhelming amount of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 For this study, river basin organizations may include bodies namely, “commission”, “committee”, 
“organization”, “authority”, etc. 
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bilateral and multilateral riparian institutions have been formed, with the oldest dating 
back to over 3000 years. Scholarship suggests that cooperation is likely to endure 
between riparian states once a treaty has been signed (Brochmann 2012: 144-5). While 
this thesis is not concerned with the origins of cooperation, it seeks to build upon the 
literature to further understand how the institutional regime itself contributes to the 
success of regime. 
The literature fails to explain why certain institutions have endured over time 
between contentious states, such as the Indus Water Treaty between India and Pakistan. 
One explanation is that essential institutional characteristics reduce the uncertainties and 
apprehensions that surround the development of international river management as a 
factor of influence. This thesis builds upon the existing literature surrounding the 
institutional makeup of international river organizations. It investigates the conditions 
under which international riparian institutions are successful in mitigating conflict. 
Without analyzing the institutional characteristics that contribute to the success of 
regimes, international relations scholars and policy makers would not be able to 
understand the nature of international riparian institutions. 
I hypothesize that certain institutional characteristics increase the likelihood of 
regime success in mitigating conflict. River Basin Organizations are created for a variety 
of purposes: environmental, navigation, allocation, etc. Moreover, the scope and design 
of river institutions vary from basin to basin. While it is important to assess whether the 
organization has been successful in altering behavior to achieve the institution’s primary 
purpose, this thesis is concerned with river basins in the context of international security. 
It seeks to analyze the overarching security that institutions provide to international river 
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basins in order to gain a generalized knowledge of the effects certain elements of river 
basin organizations have on security in river basins. Therefore, for purposes of this thesis, 
RBO success is defined in terms of international security instead of behavioral change or 
problem-solving terms.  
The fluctuating nature of rivers requires an agreement that is able to adapt and 
manage unforeseeable events. I expect that four particular institutional characteristics 
affect the success of the agreement: adaptability of the institution in its allocation of 
resources; a formal dispute mechanism written into the treaty or charter; a formal 
enforcement mechanism written into the treaty or charter with clear repercussions if 
provisions are breached; and, data shared between signatories. I expect the presence of 
these four variables to be positively related to the level of cooperation amongst parties 
and the success of an international regime. 
 
Research Questions: 
• What river regime institutional characteristics have the most effect on the success 
of the international riparian institutions? 
• Under what conditions are riparian institutional regimes successful in maintaining 
compliance? 
• Do the four institutional characteristics (adaptability, dispute mechanism, 
enforcement mechanism, and sharing of data) affect the degree of cooperation? 
• Does the combination of certain institutional characteristics have an impact on the 
effectiveness of the regime? 
• Are bilateral institutions more successful than multilateral institutions? 
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• Does the state political regime type of riparian states have an effect on 
adaptability, dispute mechanisms, enforcement mechanisms, and obligation to 
share data? 
• Does the percentage of co-riparian states party to the regime affect the security in 
the river basin?  




Theoretical and analytical models in the literature identify several variables as 
influencing the effectiveness of river basin organizations. To study the relationship 
between institutional characteristics and the success of institutional river regimes in 
mitigating conflict, a sample focusing on Europe, Asia and Africa is used. By studying 
these three continents, this thesis is able to compare the riparian institutions across both 
developing and developed countries. The river commissions established in Europe date 
back to 1815 and 1948; whereas, the commissions present in Asia and Africa were 
established in the later half of the twentieth century and in the twenty-first century. 
Therefore, the study will not be biased in examining a specific time frame.  
The term international river is used in its broadest definition in this thesis. All 
rivers that are shared by two or more states are included in the sample. Toset et al. 
classifies rivers into three types: upstream/downstream rivers, boundary rivers and mixed 
rivers. No distinction is drawn in this thesis between rivers serving as an international 
border, upstream/downstream rivers, and mixed rivers. According to Toset et al., all three 
	  
	   10	  
types of rivers are at risk for conflict, but the nature of upstream/downstream rivers 
makes these rivers more prone to conflict (2000: 989-990). River agreements focus on a 
variety of issue areas. The most common treaties and institutions signed center around 
water flow quantity, quality of the water, and streamflow alterations such as dams, 
amongst others. To gain a more wide-ranging understanding of important institutional 
mechanism, all types of river organizations and agreements are incorporated in this study. 
An international relations theory would serve little use if it were too particularistic in the 
type of international rivers.  
In order to have the most comprehensive knowledge, combinations of both 
multilateral and bilateral river basins are examined. Additionally, a variety of 
international river basins within each region that are governed by international 
organizations are used in the study as well as basins that are governed only by a treaty. A 
sample that represents the two different types of governance permits a comparative 
analysis of the effectiveness of each method of governance. For each continent, three 
institutionalized river basins and two river basins with formal agreements that are not 
institutionalized are used.2 Additionally, the level of conflict in the basin before and after 
the creation of a river basin organization is compared to access the success of the 
institution and whether the institution has been more successful in the place of previous 
treaties. This thesis is then able to test whether formal institutional organizations are more 
effective than treaties or if the converse proves to be true.  
Information is primarily used from the International Water Event Database 
(IWED) and the International Freshwater Treaty Database, two projects supported by the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 The exception is the examination of African river basins. There are no international river basins with data 
available on the continent that has formal cooperation, but has not institutionalized relations. 
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Oregon State University Department of Geosciences.3 The IWED documents over 7100 
historical international water relations from 1948 to 2008.  The International Freshwater 
Treaty Database contains information, including institution structure, of approximately 
450 international, freshwater agreements, spanning the years 1820 to 2007. The 
agreements cover a variety of issue areas, including border issues, joint management, 
irrigation, territorial issues, water quality and water quantity, amongst other issue areas. 
Minor agreements are excluded from this study. According to the Transboundary 
Freshwater Dispute Database (TFDD), minor agreements are agreements that contain 
components related to water as a resource, but the water component is insignificant and 
little related to water resource management issues (e.g., a clause allowing border guards 
to access drinking water on adjacent territory). The TFDD and IWED cover water events 
up to 2007 and 2008, respectively. Therefore, the time period of analysis is slightly 
restricted by the available data. 
To gain an understanding of the characteristics that allow institutional regimes to 
be successful, the research surveys river disagreements that have occurred under the 
presence of an international organization overseeing that particular river. By comparing 
the institutional characteristics of organizations that resulted in peaceful mitigation of 
river events with those that were unsuccessful in producing peaceful results, a pattern of 
important characteristics emerges. 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 “Product of the International freshwater treaties database, Department of Geosciences, Oregon State 
University.  Additional information about the TFDD can be found at: 
<http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu>.” 
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1.1.1 Dependent Variable: Organizational Success 
No common definition of effectiveness of success appears in the literature of 
conflict and cooperation in international river basins. Scholars apply their own definition 
of effectiveness according to the governance process they are focusing on. This thesis 
defines success of the river basin organization (RBO) or the international river treaty as 
whether it is effectively able to mitigate conflict between riparian states and increase 
security in the basin. For this thesis, the term international river basin organization is used 
as overarching term for any kind of international organization, commission, or committee 
governing a shared watercourse. To borrow Neda Zawahri’s definitions, cooperation 
exists when states alter their behavior to accommodate their riparian neighbors’ concerns. 
Conflict occurs when riparian states maintain the status quo when their neighbor has a 
claim (Zawahri 2006: 1043). States can be considered in conflict even if they have signed 
a treaty.  
Success is measured by the peaceful resolution of disputes, not the state of 
harmony between riparians. The success of the treaty or RBO in mitigating the conflict is 
measured on the BAR scale. The scale codes data from the Transboundary Dispute 
Database and the International Freshwater Treaty Database, two projects supported by the 
Oregon State University Department of Geosciences.4 The BAR scale codes each 
international water dispute on a scale of -7 to +7.  The most peaceful outcomes 
(voluntary unity) receive a +7. The most conflictive events (declaration of war over 
water) are ranked -7. A score of 0 indicates a neutral outcome.  The below table outlines 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 “Product of the International freshwater treaties database, Department of Geosciences, Oregon State 
University.  Additional information about the TFDD can be found at: 
<http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu>.” 
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the event descriptions as defined by the Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database. For 
the purposes of this study, an institutional regime is considered successful in any event 
that receives a score of +1 through +7. To calculate a basin’s BAR scale score, the BAR 
score of all events prior and after the agreement as recorded by the TFDD are averaged.  
 
 
1.1.2 Explanatory Variables 
This thesis considers four distinct explanatory variables in order to examine the 
effectiveness of institutions in preventing conflict over international rivers: adaptability 
of the institution, dispute mechanism, compliance mechanism, and shared data between 
signatories. Information and data will be taken from the treaties themselves and the Atlas 
of International Freshwater Agreements and the International Freshwater Treaty Database 




-7 Formal declaration of war 
-6 Extensive war acts causing deaths, dislocation or high strategic cost 
-5 Small scale military acts 
-4 Political-military hostile actions 
-3 Diplomatic-economic hostile actions 
-2 Strong verbal expressions displaying hostility in interaction 
-1 Mild verbal expressions displaying discord in interaction 
0 Neutral or non-significant acts for international situation 
+1 Minor official exchanges, talks or policy expressions 
+2 Official verbal support of goals, values or regime 
+3 Cultural or scientific agreement or support (non-strategic) 
+4 Non-military economic, technological or industrial agreement 
+5 Military economic or strategic support 
+6 International freshwater treaty; major strategic alliance 
+7 Voluntary unification into one nation 
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The flow of rivers naturally fluctuates; rivers go through annual and seasonal 
changes in water flow quantity. The varying quantity of water supply to states must 
consequently be accounted for to mitigate any potential concerns over water availability. 
Adaptability mechanisms enhance the success of cooperation between riparian states. I 
expect the basins that include an adaptability mechanism will have higher scores on the 
BAR scale. 
The regimes are coded for an adaptable agreement. The adaptability mechanisms 
take many forms: allocation strategies, amendment processes, review processes, 
revocation clauses, and institutional responsibilities. This thesis focuses solely on 
amendment processes. The ability to amend agreements is essential to maintaining a 
secure basin and preventing stakeholders from defecting from the agreement. The 
average of the BAR scale scores for agreements containing the mechanism are compared 
to the average of the agreements excluding the mechanism. I expect the basins with 
amendment processes will have higher scores on the BAR scale than those that excluded 
the mechanism. 
 This thesis also tests for the effect of dispute mechanisms on basinwide security. 
The most obvious disputes arise between riparian states over allocation of water 
resources, pollution of water, or a new dam. However, technical disputes over treaty 
clauses and interpretations often present themselves as a challenge to implementing the 
institution. Consequently, states must find a means to handle any administrative disputes 
in addition to other conflicts. Dispute mechanisms reduce conflict over vagueness or 
interpretations of treaties or charters. Dispute mechanisms are also essential for settling 
any violations of provisions. The impact of any dispute mechanism is measured by 
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comparing agreements that contain dispute mechanisms with those that do not. I expect 
that water events that received a score of -7 to -1 on the BAR scale will either lack a 
dispute mechanism in the managing regime or have a low presence of dispute 
mechanisms.   
Any successful international agreement should have a compliance mechanism in 
place. In an anarchical international system, where states are not required to sign a treaty 
or cooperate, the absence of a means to enforce the law leaves little incentive for states to 
comply with the provisions of the treaty. In this thesis, compliance and enforcement are 
studied together, as they are two related concerns.  
The compliance variable has two components: the enforcement mechanism and 
the monitoring mechanism. These two types of compliance mechanisms are examined in 
the study because they are two of the most commonly used mechanisms to entice states to 
comply with international law. Incentives to comply with international law generally take 
the shape of either positive or negative enforcement mechanisms. The two most common 
enforcement incentives – sanctions and reparations – are often used in international 
agreements. Monitoring mechanisms are also included in the study. They often take the 
shape of reporting on implementation of the provisions outlined in the agreement. 
The two types of enforcement mechanisms are assessed both as an aggregate and 
individually. The BAR scale scores of the basins that contain any type of compliance 
mechanism are averaged and compared to the averages of the basins that do not have any 
compliance mechanism in the basin agreement. Then, the two compliance mechanisms 
are isolated to compare the BAR scale score averages of each variable to those basins in 
which the variables are absent. I expect to find that the absence of any compliance 
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mechanism in the institutional regime will lead to a low level of success in mitigating 
conflict. 
 States tend to trust one another more when their interactions are transparent 
(Stinnett and Tir 2009: 232-3; Abbott and Snidal 1998: 12). Open data sharing increases 
the likelihood of institutional regime success because it enables better allocation of 
resources and accurate reporting of consumption by each party. Data sharing allows for 
accurate reporting of the consumption levels needed by each state to maintain its human 
security and industry levels. Consequently, data sharing helps to alleviate some of the 
apprehension of joining an international institution and voluntarily ceding a portion of 
sovereignty. Therefore, I hypothesize provisions for data sharing in riparian institutions 
will increase the success of the regime. I compare regimes where data sharing is 
mandatory with those where data sharing is voluntarily provided by member states. As 
with coding for adaptability, dispute mechanisms, and enforcement mechanisms, the 
average BAR scale score of basins requiring data exchange is compared to those that do 
not require it. 
 
1.1.3 Control Variables 
 This thesis controls for three variables to test the validity of the research: success 
of river basin organizations versus the success of river treaties; state regime type; and 
membership of the RBO and treaty. The primary concern is whether the findings hold 
true for both treaties and organizations. To compare the effectiveness of RBOs and 
treaties, the BAR scale averages for each type of each international river management 
system will be taken and analyzed. I anticipate that the basins with river basin 
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organizations will have a higher overall score compared to the basins without an RBO. 
However, I anticipate that any basin with the four institutional mechanisms present will 
be more secure than the basins that did not include the mechanisms, regardless of the 
presence or absence of a river basin organization. 
This thesis also controls for the state regime type of co-riparian states. The 
democratic peace theory claims that states are more likely to cooperate when both are 
democratic. Under the theory, democracies are considered to be more trustworthy since 
they exhibit a greater amount of transparency in their processes. Common democratic 
values and norms present in democracies foster easier agreement between democracies. 
Cooperation between democracies and autocracies or between two or more autocracies 
can prove more challenging. Consensus is more difficult to reach between parties with 
vastly different priorities (Layne 1994).  
States are coded for democracy based on the Polity IV index. The Polity IV index 
is supported by the Political Instability Task Force, Societal-Systems Research Inc, and 
Center for Systemic Peace. It measures the democratic nature of states on a 21-point 
spectrum ranging from -10 to +10. Classifications of governing authorities include fully 
institutionalized autocracies, mixed, incoherent, anocracies and fully institutionalized 
democracies. In the interest of simplicity, three categories are used in this thesis to 
compare the effect of state regime type on international security in shared river basins. 
The categories mixed, incoherent and anocracies of the Polity IV index are labeled as 
anocracies and range from -5 to +5. Anocracies are considered forms of government with 
scores that are not low enough to be considered autocracies and scores that are not high 
enough to be considered democracies.  
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Fully institutionalized autocracies and fully institutionalized democracies are 
labeled autocracies (-10 to -6) and democracies (+6 to +10), respectively. The sum of the 
polity scores of all members of the basin is averaged to find the polity score of the river 
basin. To test the validity of the democratic peace theory in international river basins, 
basins with a score of +6 and higher are compared to non-democratic basins with a score 
of +5 and lower.  
The Polity IV index coding is compared to the Freedom House’s Freedom in the 
World publication. The index measures states on political freedoms and civil liberties. 
The two variables are coded on a scale of +1 (most free) through +7 (least free). The 
scores of the political freedoms and civil liberties are averaged to give the state an overall 
score. To code for the freedom level of the river basin, the polity index average is taken 
for all states within the basin. The freedom score for the year the agreement was signed is 
used to code the cases. The two exceptions are the Niger River Basin that was created in 
1964 and the Permanent Indus Commission that was established in 1960. The Freedom 
House Polity Index data reports data beginning in 1972. Therefore, the Niger River 
Basin’s and the Indus River Basins’ freedom indices are coded based on the data for 1972 
instead of 1964 and 1960, respectively. The Freedom House and Polity IV indices are 
compared to rule out inconsistencies that may arise from using different indices. When 
compared, cases are classified in the same category for each index used. Since 
cooperation is mutually beneficial to all states involved, regardless of state regime type, I 
anticipate state regime types will not affect the security of the basin. 
 Finally, the number of states party to an institutional regime may affect the regime 
itself. A potential objection to theories is if not all riparian states are members of the 
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institution, the possibility of conflict increases. The average BAR scale score of river 
basins with full membership to the agreement is compared to those that only have partial 
participation. I anticipate the level of participation of states party to the agreement will 
not affect the security of the basin.   
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Many scholars focus on the wider environmental security debate in the 
international riparian literature. One of the main subjects that international relations 
theorists study is why states cooperate over international rivers. States are concerned with 
absolute gains over relative gains and will only cooperate when cooperation produces 
more gains than acting unilaterally (Dinar 2008: 11). A collective action problem remains 
when states seek to maximize their gains from an internationally shared resource 
(Zawahri and Mitchell 2011: 840; Benvenisti 1996: 388-92). If each state sharing a 
common river increases its consumption, the collective consumption nears the 
sustainability rate of the river. When consumption exceeds the rate of sustainability, 
resource scarcity increases in a basin already at risk.  
A main subject of debate in the literature revolves around the impending “water 
wars” that will result from water scarcity. It will likely be the main area of international 
contention in the twenty-first century. Gleick and Alam argue that the uneven distribution 
of water, coupled with a growing global population will be a major source of 
international dispute, expanding to the use of armed conflict (Gleick 1993: 79; Alam 
2002: 341). Particularly in regions with high resource scarcity, states view competition as 
a national security issue. Since water is vital to a state’s survival, states will attempt to 
secure the necessary water they need to survive. Water wars will most likely occur 
between states with high political tension that have high water scarcity and low 
institutionalization (Gleditsch et al. 2006: 362-4). Higher levels of scarcity will lead to 
increased conflict as states resort to coercive measure to secure access to water (Stinnett 
and Tir 2009: 233). In juxtaposition, Dinar reasons that increased scarcity will encourage 
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cooperation because states need to manage the resource. The scarcity-cooperation 
relationship follows a U-shaped curve; those basins with both or all parties facing 
moderate scarcity have the highest rate of cooperation (Dinar 2009: 110). 
The theoretical literature surrounding the study of international resource 
management primarily focuses on the conditions under which states are most likely to 
cooperate. Rieu-Clarke explains the four theories of river basin management. Under the 
Harmon Doctrine, a state has authority of the water within its own territory regardless of 
the effects it may have on other states. The second theory, Absolute Territory Integrity, 
also known as riparian rights theory, says that lower riparian states have a right to 
continued and uninterrupted flow of water resources. Limited Territorial Sovereignty, or 
Limited Territorial Integrity suggests that states are free to use the waters in their territory 
as long as it does not infringe upon other riparian states’ territory or interests. The fourth 
theory, Doctrine of Equitable Utilization, states that all co-riparian states are entitled to a 
share in the shared resource (Rieu-Clarke 2005: 101-10; Gleick 1993: 106-7; Ochao-Ruiz 
2005: 348-9). Gleick argues that the Harmon Doctrine or the Doctrine of Equitable 
Utilization primarily influences a state’s behavior. Ochao-Ruiz maintains that Doctrine of 
Equitable Utilization is the cornerstone of international watercourse law.  
Realism plays a large role in the literature. According to realists, a state is most 
likely to cooperate when its national interests are not at stake and it has little to lose 
(Barrett 2003). International relations theorist James Fearon demonstrates that states are 
rational actors pursuing policies that benefit their own interests. According to rationalist 
theory, states measure the costs and benefits of their international policies prior to taking 
action. If the repercussions exceed the benefits, a state will not pursue the policy (Fearon 
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1995: 381). Therefore, states will only cooperate when their losses for maintaining the 
status quo are greater than reaching an agreement (Brochmann and Hensel 2011: 865). If 
the provisions outlined under the treaty are not dissimilar to a state’s intended actions in 
the absence of the treaty, the state does not stand to lose anything.  
Alternatively, Thucydides argues that power distribution is the decisive factor in 
the success of negotiations. The dominant power in any international system will act as it 
sees fit to further its goals and the weaker states have no choice but to accept it 
(Thucydides 2008). Borrowing from hegemonic stability theory, weaker states lack the 
resources and capabilities to challenge the hegemon. The nature of upstream/downstream 
rivers epitomizes the hegemonic stability theory. Upstream states have the clear 
advantage since their use of the river is unimpeded (Brochmann and Hensel 2011: 862). 
The upstream state holds more power over the downstream state since it can manipulate 
the control of the quantity and quality flowing downstream through the use of dams 
(Zawahri 2006: 1054). Zawahari goes further to argue that upstream states can use data 
sharing as a weapon when it is not required under an agreement. Data withholding can 
leave downstream states vulnerable since they cannot prepare for variations in water 
cycles. The strong upstream state has little incentive to cooperate since their losses for 
maintaining the status quo will be minimal (Zawahri and Mitchell 2011: 837). They are 
better able to resist pressures and demands of weaker downstream states, particularly if 
the upstream state is more powerful militarily and economically. Consequently, 
uncoordinated development causes the most harm for the furthest downstream state 
(Zawahri 2006: 1049). Sometimes, the downstream state may have to absorb some costs 
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to incentivize the upstream state, resulting in side-payments. Cost-sharing becomes more 
prevalent in basins where the river forms a boundary between states (Dinar 2008: 61). 
However, Zawahari goes on to point out that downstream states can also hold an 
advantage over their upstream neighbors. Downstream riparians can use the river as a 
‘weapon’ by refusing the upstream state’s drainage (Zawahri 2008: 287). Dinar argues 
that in some rivers, the upstream state may be the downstream state along some branches 
or tributaries. Therefore, it would be disadvantageous for either side to exploit their 
upstream position (Dinar 2008: 22). The Tigris-Euphrates river basin is a classic example 
where branches zigzag back and forth across the border of upstream and downstream 
states.  
Neoliberal institutionalists claim that states are rational egotists and will cooperate 
for gains. Cooperation produces mutually satisfying outcomes (Dinar 2009: 115). Dinar 
argues that cooperation may often produce more gains for powerful states than exploiting 
their portion of the river (Dinar 2008: 24). Dombrowksy believes that river basin 
management should be coordinated at the river basin level where all riparian states 
involved should work together. The collaboration of all riparians, whether they are 
powerful or weak, will produce the best outcomes (Dombrowsky 2008: 457). 
Collective action theory outlines the problems that arise when states manage 
common-pool resources.  Elinor Ostrom explains that the uncertainties surrounding 
common-pool resources, such as floods or decreased rainfall inhibit cooperation. 
Engaging in collective action will increase the benefits shared by all appropriators. 
However, stakeholders are less likely to contribute when the benefits are not immediately 
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apparent. Actors are more willing to contribute when the benefits will be realized in the 
immediate future (Ostrom 1990: 33-41). 
 Just as international rivers can be a catalyst for conflict, Dinar maintains that they 
can also drive cooperation between riparians (Dinar 2008). According to realists, 
cooperation should not occur between states. Elhance as well as Just and Netanyahu 
argue that cooperation fails because it challenges the core of statehood: sovereignty, 
territorial integrity and security (Elhance 1999: 7; Just and Netanyahu 1998: 10). Some 
scholars have looked at the dynamics of international river basins as an explaination for 
cooperation in international river basins. Brochmann argues that the democratic peace 
theory does not come into play in riparian relations. She explains that two democracies 
do not cooperate more than other regime types because democracies tend to be in areas 
where water is not a critical issue (2012: 158). 
A large portion of the literature analyzes the conditions that influence the creation 
of riparian agreements and institutions. On the other hand, political scientists Yoffe, Wolf 
and Giordano have focused on the institutional membership structure of river basin 
organizations. For instance, formal cooperation tends to emerge more frequently between 
dyads than in multilateral river basins (Yoffe, Wolf, and Giordano 2003: 1117). States 
may choose to sign bilateral treaties instead of multilateral treaties if some states have 
low interest in reaching an agreement and no basinwide agreement seems likely (Zawahri 
and Mitchell 2011: 838; Mohamed 2003: 221-223). Consensus is easier to reach between 
two parties. More concessions must be made as the number of states party to the 
agreement increases; bilateralism simplifies communication. 
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Zawahari and Mitchell argue that state interests, transaction costs, and distribution 
of power (2011: 836) are the most important factors in cooperation. In hydro-politics, an 
imbalance in power can impede cooperation. Schmeier agree that RBOs are more 
effective if power is equally distributed amongst stakeholders. The constellation of actors 
and distribution of power is the determinate of whether and to what extent resources will 
be governed effectively (Schmeier 2013: 67-77). 
Many scholars focus on specific elements of agreements that encourage 
cooperation. Zawahri and Mitchell feel that the guarantee of adherence to the treaty or 
RBO is the most important element to study. The low interest in signing a treaty, due to 
the high likelihood of future reneging, impedes the negotiation process (Zawahri and 
Mitchell 2011: 837). According to the managerial school, states will not dedicate the time 
or resources to negotiating a treaty that will most likely be violated (Downs, Rocke, and 
Barsoom 1996: 380; Chayes and Chayes 1993: 184). If a state knows it will violate the treaty 
because the treaty is not aligned with its policy objectives, a state will not waste the time and 
money to negotiate since the state’s reputation will be damaged if it reneges on a treaty. 
Adaptability mechanisms can decrease the likelihood of violations. Sadoff et al. advocate for 
joint management committees in the organization to manage the fluctuating nature of 
rivers. Joint management committees allow for formal modifications that may need to be 
made. Joint management institutions can reduce the transaction costs of agreements and 
decrease the likelihood of future breakdowns (Sadoff et al. 2008: 70). 
Enforcement and compliance is unlikely to work in an environment where defection 
proves the better option over cooperation (Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom 1996: 384). The 
problem of commitment and the problem of monitoring are the two main issues of 
common-pool resources (Ostrom 1990: 43-4). However, Chayes and Chayes argue when 
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states do choose to sign a treaty, they are most likely to cooperate and uphold treaties 
after signing because it is in their best interest. Signatories comply and in turn expect 
other states to comply, creating an environment of trust in which cooperation is expected 
and upheld (Chayes and Chayes 1993: 184).  
An additional factor affecting the success of RBOs is the management of disputes 
when they arise. Many scholars argue the presence of a dispute resolution mechanism is 
essential for ensuring the effectiveness of river basin organizations (Finger, Schmid, and 
Wüest 2006; Ochao-Ruiz 2005: 353-4; Grossman 2006: 66). The presence of a dispute 
resolution mechanism lays the foundation for a cooperative relationship between the 
riparian states. The absence of such a mechanism provides ample room for cheating and 
defection from the agreement without repercussions. 
Grossman maintains that information and data exchange is essential for 
cooperation and should be transparent, thus inspiring confidence in negotiations and 
future cooperation (Grossman 2006: 229). Information and data exchange lay the 
groundwork for determining resource allocation. However, if stakeholders suspect 
inaccurate or false data reporting, the relationship could be compromised. Chenoweth and 
Feitelson argue that joint data collection, sharing or exchange is most likely to occur only 
when all parties view it as being beneficial (Chenoweth and Feitelson 2001: 510). 
Accurate data exchange increases transparency of the governance process. According to 
Berardo and Gerlak, transparency increases the effective management of shared resources 
because stakeholders can understand the inner workings of the governance process 
(Berardo and Gerlak 2012: 104). 
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 According to some international relations scholars, the agreement itself may 
affect cooperation. Text ambiguity, temporal dimension of river treaties and limited 
capabilities to carry out provisions all limit the ability of states to comply with a treaty 
(Brochmann 2012: 147). Approximately 40% of river basin agreements include 
provisions in addition to water management (Brochmann 2012: 146; United Nations 
Development Programme 2006: 224). Faniran suggests a sectoral approach to river 
management may hinder the success of the institution. Treaties focusing on one aspect 
only, such as dams, are limited in their abilities to govern the shared rivers (Faniran 1980: 
12). An agreement with a larger scope increases the likelihood or cooperation in river 
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Chapter 3: Explanatory Variables 
 The anarchical nature of the international system creates an uncertain 
environment, in which states may incur a risk in their relations with other states. 
International law provides an opportunity for states to improve their relations and reach 
or strengthen agreements in a secure and structured environment. International law, in the 
form of either a treaty or institutional organization, allows co-riparian states to settle 
disputes to decrease the chance of both militarized and economic conflict over shared 
watercourses. The absence of an overarching international river law forces states to 
cooperate through joint measures. Yet, the lack of a universal international law also gives 
states flexibility in choosing how to cooperate and what provisions to include in their 
agreements.  
 The incorporation of certain institutional design functions in international river 
law increases the chance of mitigating and avoiding conflict between riparian states. 
Specifically, four design features present in international riparian treaties and 
organizations create an environment in which states are more willing to come to terms 
and negotiate with each other: adaptability, enforcement mechanisms, dispute 
mechanisms, and data sharing. 
 
3.1 Adaptability of Institution 
 Rivers are a naturally fluctuating resource; they go through cyclical annual and 
seasonal changes in water flow quantity. Consequently, states must prepare for the 
varying quantity of water supply and be able to mitigate any potential concerns over 
water availability, such as droughts or floods. It is important for institutions to be able to 
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adapt and change to overcome unforeseen challenges that may arise in the future 
(Berardo and Gerlak 2012: 116). Formal treaties are difficult to alter once signed; 
therefore, the institutions must be designed to handle unexpected changes in conditions in 
the river basin (Sadoff et al. 2008: 83). For example, the 1994 agreement between Israel 
and Jordan did not include an adaptability mechanism; consequently the drought in 1999 
threated to dissolve peace between the two nations because they were unable to 
adequately and quickly react to the change in water levels.  
 States are able to prepare for hydrological variability by including certain 
amendment mechanisms in treaties. First, instead of measuring water allocation in fixed 
quantities, states should elect to allocate resources in terms of percentages of water 
availability. Additionally, organizations can be created to jointly manage the changing 
nature of rivers. Joint management committees between the parties allows for formal 
modifications that may need to be made (Sadoff et al. 2008: 66) 
 
3.2 Compliance Mechanism 
Even though a state may sign an agreement or join an organization does not mean 
it is willing or able to comply with the provisions. Institutions with effective reporting 
and implementation reviews are likely to be successful in maintaining cooperation and 
security in the river basin. Bernauer argues that the performance of riparian agreements 
increases when organizations monitor the behavior of the parties (Bernauer 1997: 188). 
The absence of a means to enforce the law leaves little incentive for states to follow the 
stipulations outlined in the treaty. However, compliance and enforcement are two-fold. 
Compliance deals with an on-going process of states adhering to the provisions of the 
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treaty and contributing as required (e.g., submitting data information, paying dues, etc.). 
On the other hand, enforcement deals with, mainly, punitive measures to entice states to 
comply with the agreements they make. The most commonly used form of negative 
enforcement mechanism in international relations is economic sanctions. Other types 
include trade, financial and asset sanctions. Not all enforcement mechanisms are 
negative, sometimes states include positive means, such as rewards, or “carrots” 
(Bradford and Ben-Shahar 2011: 380-2). 
One of the best ways to ensure compliance with a treaty or organization, without 
requiring action from the members, is to promote the policies in a positive light. Even 
when a member state is opposed to a certain decision or policy, implementation should be 
seen as fostering cooperation and support, rather than an inconvenience to the state 
(United Nations 2009: 34). Nevertheless, in high politics, this approach is not always 
effective and must be supported through other means.  
One type of mechanism to manage compliance is implementing a monitoring 
mechanism. To guarantee compliance, a treaty or organization may require periodic 
checks on the parties. For example, a treaty may require parties to regularly submit 
reports or undergo evaluations and holding annual joint meetings to ensure compliance.  
The second part of the variable is concerned with what happens when states do 
not comply. Incentives to comply with international law generally take the shape of either 
positive or negative enforcement mechanisms.  Enforcement mechanisms can reduce the 
attempt to cheat because an impending fine for not complying with the agreement deters 
noncompliance. A treaty should clearly state how an event of noncompliance would be 
handled. For the most effective results to bring a party back to compliance, a treaty 
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should include a mixture of components: incentives to comply as well as punitive 
measures (Sadoff et al. 2008: 62). When states do not adhere to agreements, the potential 
for serious conflict rises, thus disrupting any current cooperation and negotiations and 
decreasing the likelihood of developing cooperation in the immediate future. When 
compliance is managed, however, the transaction costs of cooperation decrease. 
 
3.3 Dispute Mechanism 
No matter how carefully institutions are crafted, disputes will inevitably arise, 
whether they are over operations of an institution or interpretations of a treaty. Scholars 
agree that the inclusion of a dispute mechanism is essential to long-lasting organizations 
(Schmeier 2013: 54). The most obvious disputes that arise between riparian states 
concern allocation of water resources, pollution of water, or the creation of a new dam. 
However, technical disputes over treaty clauses and interpretations often present 
themselves as a challenge to implementing the treaty or institution. Dispute mechanisms 
reduce conflict over vagueness or interpretations of treaties or charters. They are also 
essential for settling any violations of provisions.  
Unless specifically indicated in the treaty, states cannot be forced to adhere to a 
mode of settlement. There are multiple ways states can elect to handle dispute. For 
example, riparian states can adopt agreements that outline effective ad hoc dispute 
mechanisms to handle any conflict that may arise. On the other hand, the International 
Law Association (ILA) recommends referral to a joint agency or seeking mediation of a 
third party as the most effective way to mitigate riparian dispute. If all other modes fail to 
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resolve the conflict, the parties should seek a solution through an arbitral tribunal or the 
International Court of Justice (Ochao-Ruiz 2005: 372-4). 
Negotiations are typically the first-sought means to handle disputes before 
proceeding to more formal resolution measures. Negotiations provide the most flexibility 
for states to maintain control over the process and occur in multiple modes: traditional 
diplomatic channels, summit discussions, and international joint commissions. Joint 
commissions are the most often used means for riparian dispute settlement since they are 
outlined in many treaties and are typically the first step to resolution before utilizing other 
modes. Most problems seem to be resolved here before they turn into larger issues 
(Ochao-Ruiz 2005: 362-4).  
However, if disputes are unable to be handled at the negotiation level, they can 
become more involved and seek resolution through arbitration. Adjudicative means are 
typically a final resort. Adjudication involves being examined by an impartial third party, 
such as another states, the World Bank, or even the International Court of Justice, and 
results in a binding decision. However, states may seek third party involvement for 
mediation without reaching the adjudicative level.  
 
3.4 Data and Information Exchange 
Most data is gathered domestically and is not disseminated internationally. Thus, 
it is safe to assume that most river states do not have access to meteorological and 
hydrological data from other states. States also tend to be suspicious of the data that is 
released by co-riparian states because they believe the data is not accurate or may be 
fudged to benefit the state releasing the data. In private negotiations, private information 
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may remain private for various reasons. For example, states may withhold information 
for strategic purposes or a lack of communication. A common, transparent database that 
is easily accessible to all riparians is key to maintain cooperation in the basin (Nakayama 
2003: 103; Grossman 2006: 229). 
There is a distinction between bilateral data sharing between two members of an 
institution and centralized data sharing. States can opt to exchange data informally, 
without the involvement of the river basin organization. Centralized data sharing is 
formalized sharing that involves the institution in coordinating and managing the 
collection of data. This thesis focuses on centralized data sharing that is overseen by the 
organization. Schmeier argues that institutional involvement in data and information 
exchange can be expected to be more effective than bilateral means because it provides 
clear rules and access to the information (2013: 52). Involvement of the institution 
permits the benefit of joint-fact finding efforts to pool information and translate the data 
into a form that is usable. Pure data gathering cannot affect difference in water resource 
management; it must be converted to information in order to be used. River basin 
organizations can create data transmission instruments, such as bibliographic information 
systems, data information systems, water management models, hydrological databases 
and joint water resources assessments (Grossman 2006: 220-3). Additionally, 
international organizations are vital to harmonizing data from different states that may 
not be held to equal standards. Organizations can uniform standards and make the data 
compatible and, therefore, useful in managing rivers. 
States tend to trust one another more when their interactions are transparent. 
Cooperation increases when greater transparency and information sharing is present in 
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states’ relationships (Stinnett and Tir 2009: 232-3; Abbott and Snidal 1998: 12; 
Grossman 2006: 298). Open data and information sharing increases the likelihood of 
institutional regime success because it enables better allocation of resources and accurate 
reporting of consumption by each party. Data sharing in agreements requires stakeholders 
to agree on the accuracy and acceptability of the shared data. Therefore the parties can 
appropriately plan on how to distribute the shared resource.  
Article 9 of the 1997 Convention on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of 
International Watercourses obligates data and information sharing. Riparian states should 
regularly share data and information on conditions of the shared watercourse and relevant 
forecasts (e.g., flood events and droughts). Moreover, articles 11 and 12 of the 
Convention compel states to share information on planned projects, such as dams (United 
Nations 1997). International organizations are vital to harmonizing data from different 
countries that may not be held to equal standards. IOs can uniform the standards and 
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Chapter 4: Control Variables 
 Sometimes external factors outside the institutional design feature of 
organizations are thought to be responsible for the success or failure of RBOs. State 
regime type may have an effect on whether states comply or even cooperate in 
negotiations to reach an initial agreement. According to democratic peace theory, 
democracies are more likely to cooperate with other democracies because they share 
similar governing principles and values. Additionally, the number of riparian states may 
affect the magnitude of conflict within the river basins. If not all riparians that share a 
transboundary river sign an agreement, the likelihood of overall peace within the basin 
may decrease. The outliers could feel insecure in their access to the shared resource. 
Finally, for policy purposes, it is important to understand whether treaties and 
organizations have comparable success rates. The institutionalization of agreements is 
typically seen as being more effective than treaties alone. Whether these three variables 
hold true in international river management is important from a policy perspective for the 
future development of international river treaties and organizations. 
 
4.1 State Regime Type 
 The democratic peace theory asserts that states are more likely to cooperate when 
both are democratic. The theory maintains that democracies behave differently toward 
other democracies compared to the way democracies behave toward autocracies. 
Democracies tend to be more trustworthy since they exhibit a greater amount of 
transparency in their processes. Common democratic values and norms present in 
democracies foster easier agreement between democracies. Cooperation between 
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democracies and autocracies or between two or more autocracies can prove more 
challenging. Consensus is more difficult to reach between parties with vastly different 
priorities (Layne 1994).  
 Nevertheless, when states consider that cooperation will be more beneficial than 
maintaining the status quo, they are more likely to cooperate than not despite their state 
regime type (Brochmann and Hensel 2011: 877). While the democratic peace theory 
tends to hold true in other areas of international security, two democracies are not 
necessarily more likely to cooperate over international river management. One possible 
explanation, offered by Brochmann, is that democracies tend to be geographically located 
in areas where water is not a critical issue (2012: 158). In the areas where riparian 
cooperation is critical to managing the scarce resources (e.g., Africa and the Middle 
East), the states are a mixture of democratic and non-democratic regimes. Therefore, the 




The number of states party to an institutional regime may affect the regime itself. 
A potential objection that may be raised is: if not all riparian states are members of the 
institution, the possibility of conflict increases. However, I anticipate the percentage of 
states party will not affect the success of the regime based on the four characteristics. If 
the presence of the four institutional characteristics is strong, the success will not be 
affected.  
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Mitchell and Keilbach argue that a smaller number of participants in an agreement 
makes cooperation easier. According to institutionalist theory, as the number of 
stakeholders increase, the difficulty of coordinating policies also increases because the 
complexity of reaching consensus grows (Mitchell and Keilbach 2001: 897-898; see also 
Axelrod and Keohane 1985: 234-238). However, environmental politics naturally 
involves a large number of actors. The exclusion of an important stakeholder with a large 
influence over the river would hamper problem-solving efforts (Schmeier 2013: 40-1). 
A collective action problem arises when all stakeholders do not have the 
possibility to contribute to governance. Environmental politics rely heavily on knowledge 
dissemination and expertise. Schmeier maintains that knowledge regarding the state of 
the watercourse and the challenges it faces are crucial to affecting the proper response 
and governance process (2013: 56). If all stakeholders do not participate in the 
governance process, the essential information cannot be gathered and the effectiveness of 
the organization will decrease. 
Organizations are more likely to be established in multipartite river basins than 
bipartite river basins – 15 percent of bipartite river basins have organizations; 
organizations are present in 41 percent of tripartite basins (Dombrowsky 2008: 461). 
Approximately a third of the existing 86 river basin organizations are multilateral 
organizations, and two-thirds are bilateral organizations. However, when multipartite 
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4.3 Treaty vs. Body 
Much of the existing literature focuses on the effectiveness of river basin 
organizations. There is a lapse in the literature analyzing the effectiveness of international 
river agreements in basins without an institution. By comparing the effectiveness of 
agreements creating RBOs with those that do not, we are able to discern whether creating 
a river basin institution is essential to most adequately foster cooperation and 
international security. This thesis is also able to test if river basin organizations are 
extraneous and a simple treaty would suffice in most international river basins. 
The primary objective of creating an RBO is to institutionalize the negotiation 
process. River basin organizations are instrumental in maintaining cooperation through 
providing a channel for diplomacy. Organizations provide the means to disseminate 
accurate information, settle disputes, and ensure collaboration and cooperation. However, 
the institutional scope of international water resources management varies from basin to 
basin. Scope measures the extent to which riparian states are integrated in managing their 
common resource. Not all riparian treaties reach the stage of institutionalization; yet, 
cooperation is sufficiently maintained in these basins through a treaty alone.   
In her research, Dombrowsky found that organizations are more likely to be 
established in multipartite river basins than bipartite basins. A little over half of river 
basins worldwide have river basin organizations. Nevertheless, there hasn’t been a major 
conflict in the other half of the river basins (Dombrowsky 2008: 461). It is important to 
understand whether the river basins with organizations are more peaceful compared to the 
river basins with treaties alone.  
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Chapter 5: Introduction to Cases 
 In total, over 200 international river basins have been identified. The majority of 
states worldwide share at least one transboundary river. A large number of these rivers 
are shared by a significant number of countries. Nineteen transboundary rivers are shared 
by five or more states. Europe has the most international rivers (69 in total), followed by 
Latin America (61), Africa (58), Asia (57) and North America (19) (Schmeier 2013: 63-
4). 
Each river basin holds a unique geographical scope and stakeholder relations. 
Issues are not homogenous across river basins; the scope of problems is basin specific. 
River basin organizations and treaties emerge in response to their specific issues in order 
to jointly manage or solve the common problem. Consequently, not all organizations and 
treaties have the same structure or institutional mechanisms.  
River basin organizations are much more rigid in their structure in order to ensure 
stability and endurance. Nevertheless, the composition of RBOs can vary depending on 
the agreement. An RBO will most often have a decision making body, executive body 
and working body. The form of these bodies can include a secretariat, technical 
committee, working group and plenary of the Commission, amongst other bodies. 
Additionally, RBOs are stricter in their meetings and interactions. RBOs will meet 
multiple times throughout the year. Comparatively, agreements without a joint 
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5.1 Africa 
 Many of the river basins in Africa have achieved a high level of integrated 
resource management. Even the states of one of the most contentious river basins – the 
Nile – have recently established a provisional institution, the Nile River Basin Initiative. 
However, there are no cases where co-riparian states have signed a river treaty that has 
not gone on to establish a river basin organization.5 It is interesting to note that the depth 
of cooperation is split in African river basins. Riparian states have either formed a river 
basin organization, or they have no formalized agreement.  
 
5.1.1 Orange-Senqu River 
Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and South Africa comprise the Orange-Senqu River 
basin. The Orange-Senqu River begins in Lesotho, flows through South Africa and 
eventually creates the border between Namibia and South Africa before emptying into the 
Atlantic Ocean. The Orange-Senqu River does not directly pass through Botswana. 
However, Botswana, being a land-locked country surrounded completely by South 
Africa, heavily relies on the run-off and ground water from the Orange-Senqu River to 
meet its needs. The basin experiences considerable seasonal variation in precipitation, as 
well as geographic variation in rainfall and evaporation. The runoff of the Orange-Senqu 
basin is seasonal and highly variable from year to year. This could only become more 
exacerbated from the effects of climate change (Kistin and Ashton 2008: 2).  
Along with variations in runoff along the course of the river, the proportion of the 
population that relies on the Orange-Senqu River fluctuates from country to country. For 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 According to the data available through the International freshwater treaties database.  
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instance, the entire population of Lesotho depends on the Orange-Senqu River, compared 
to Botswana, which has no direct access to the river. 
The relations between the four riparian states of the Orange-Senqu River basin 
have evolved as politics have shifted in the region. Since 1983, one multilateral 
institution has been established, the Orange-Senqu River Commission (ORASECOM). 
Established in 2000, the basin-wide ORASECOM is particularly important in governing 
relations within the basin (Kistin and Ashton 2008: 8). Collaboration in the basin has 
been strengthened through the Orange River Replanning Study (ORRS). ORRS has been 
important in strengthening the relationship and trust between the riparians. The 
collaboration under the ORRS led to an official agreement for the joint development of a 
database and water resources management plan (Grossman 2006: 208). Data and 
information sharing is now a routine practice within the basin.  
 
5.1.2 Niger River 
 Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea, Cameroon, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, and 
Chad all depend on the Niger River to meet a portion of their water needs. The nine 
riparians established the Niger River Commission in 1964, one of the oldest river 
commissions. The Niger River Commission was later renamed the Niger Basin Authority 
(NBA). Initially, the NBA aimed to manage navigation, irrigation, and the environment 
of the Niger River. However, the scope was scaled back in 1986 to focus only on river 
basin development planning. The NBA has since established an information center with 
real-time hydrological forecasting capabilities that can predict flooding (Grossman 2006: 
212-3). Some have criticized the effectiveness of the Niger Basin Authority, saying it was 
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initially effective in achieving its goals in the first two decades. However, in recent 
decades, the achievements are not proportionate with the amount of money that has been 
invested (Schmeier 2013: 90). 
  
5.1.3 Zambezi River 
 The states of Angola, Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Tanzania, 
Zambia, and Zimbabwe share the Zambezi River. The eight riparians set up a governing 
body in 2004: the Zambezi Watercourse Commission (ZAMCOM). The Zambezi river 
basin is the fourth largest river in Africa. The Zambezi is disproportionally distributed 
between the riparian states. The largest portion of the river lies within Malawi and 
Zambia. Significant portions of the river flow through Zimbabwe, Mozambique and 
Angola. The remaining three states are home to minor parts of the Zambezi watershed. 
Similar to the disproportion of the river, geographic characteristics of the basin vary 
substantially, including rainfall, temperature and elevation, amongst others (Euroconsult 
Mott MacDonald 2008: 7). 
Two main managing bodies preceded the establishment of ZAMCOM. The 
bilateral Zambezi River Authority between Zimbabwe and Zambia to manage the Kariba 
Dam, bordering the two countries. The Action Plan for the Environmentally Sound 
Management of the Common Zambezi River System (ZACPLAN) was the first 
multilateral cooperation effort in the river basin when Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, 
Zambia, and Zimbabwe established it in 1987. Angola, Malawi and Namibia eventually 
joined in the early 1990s (Grossman 2006: 215-6). However, many of the efforts 
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ZACPLAN aimed to achieve were not realized because many of the signatories felt the 
plans interfered with their domestic development plans. 
 Cooperation in the Zambezi river basin played an important role in regional 
cooperation over shared freshwater resources. ZACPLAN is the precursor to a regional 
protocol created by the Southern African Development Community (SADC). The 
Southern African Development Community established the Protocol on Sharing 
Watercourse Systems in the SADC Region in 1995 (Mohamed 2003: 214). The finalized, 
amended version of the protocol was adapted in 2000. It covers not only the Zambezi, but 
also the other fourteen river basins located in SADC.  
 
5.2 Asia 
  Cooperation between riparians in Asia has not been as successful in creating 
basinwide organizations or treaties, compared to their counterparts in Europe and Africa. 
The effects of the Cold War and long-standing political tension between co-riparian states 
have hindered formal cooperation the most in East Asia and the Middle East, 
respectively. Of the cases studied in this thesis, no multilateral river basins were able to 
reach a basinwide agreement or form a basinwide institution. The Indus Water Treaty 
was only successful with the assistance of the World Bank.  
 
5.2.1 Mekong River 
The Mekong River originates in China and flows through its five downstream 
riparians: Myanmar, Lao PDR, Thailand, Cambodia, and Vietnam. It flows 
approximately 4,800 km and is divided into the Upper Mekong Basin and Lower Mekong 
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Basin. The combination of political tensions from wars and communist administrations 
has limited cooperation and resource development until recently. Additionally, the 
structure of the Mekong River itself presents complications for cooperation within the 
region. The upstream-downstream dilemma takes effect in the basin, where upstream 
states are unwilling to participate in formal institutions. 
China is an increasingly powerful state in world affairs. It’s growing population 
and economy requires more natural resources, particularly freshwater. China holds a vast 
amount of power as the upstream riparian in the Mekong River Basin. The Mekong River 
originates in China, providing China with the capability to control the quantity and 
quality of the Mekong to its downstream riparians. The situation is exacerbated by the 
fact that China is the dominant political, military, and economic state in the region 
(Menniken 2007: 101-110). 
Only four of the six riparian states have collaborated to create the Mekong River 
Commission. The Mekong River Commission was established in 1995 through the 
Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the Mekong River 
Basin between Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and Vietnam. China and Myanmar, the two 
upstream riparians have elected not to join the Commission and only participate as 
‘Dialogue Partners’. Unsurprisingly, cooperation has been a struggle to maintain in the 
region.  
 
5.2.2 Indus River  
 According to the water wars rationale, India and Pakistan should have gone to 
war. Water scarcity, lack of funding to develop infrastructure, complete dependency on 
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the Indus basin, and fragile political relations all should have fueled a conflict. 
Nevertheless, the two states have been able to cooperate over their common resource. 
Animosity between India and Pakistan originated in gaining independence from their 
common former colonial ruler. The partitioning of the two new states has fueled many 
disputes between the neighbors, including control of the shared Indus River. Pakistan 
relies on the Indus River as its sole supply of freshwater. Consequently, as the 
downstream state, Pakistan must depend on India to guarantee continued flow to meet 
Pakistan’s water needs. Conflict arose when India stopped the water flow across the 
border after the temporary agreements to supply water expired on 1 April 1948. Then-
Prime Minster Jawaharlal Nehru of India intervened to restore the water supply and enact 
an interim treaty. Interim agreements between the two riparians were signed until a final 
treaty could be agreed upon. 
 A final agreement on the collective control of the Indus basin was not reached 
until 1958. India, Pakistan, and the World Bank – the third-party mediator – signed the 
Indus Water Treaty on 19 September 1960. Since Pakistan relies solely on the Indus for 
its freshwater supply and India has multiple sources of freshwater in the east, Pakistan 
received 80% of surface waters and India received the remaining 20%. The treaty divided 
exclusive control of the six tributaries between the two riparian; the three eastern rivers 
were to be controlled by India and the three western were to be controlled by Pakistan 
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5.2.3 Tumen River 
 The Tumen River, rising in Mount Baekdu, forms the borders of Russia, North 
Korea and China. The Tumen Delta empties into the Sea of Japan, approximately 850 km 
from the Japanese port city of Niigata. The river is used for a variety of purposes, 
including industry and transportation. It is particularly vital for the agrarian societies in 
the region, particularly for rice production.  
 Negotiations over the Tumen River Basin have been affected by political and 
economic trends in the twentieth century. The lack of consistent, symmetrical diplomatic 
relations in Southeast Asia has hindered the overall cooperation efforts in the region. 
Nevertheless, growing economic strength in the region, and the end of the Cold War has 
opened the opportunity for cooperation between the ethnically and politically diverse 
states of Southeast Asia (Marton, McGee, and Paterson 1995: 10). The asymmetrical 
economic development of the region fueled the desire to jointly develop the river basin to 
maximize economic potential (Kim and Wu 1998: 241). 
In 1995, China, Russia, the Republic of Korea and Mongolia signed the Tumen 
River Area Development Project (TRADP). On a peripheral level, North Korea and Japan 
participated in TRADP, contrary to North Korea’s pattern of external relations. The 
TRADP boasts an ambitious agenda to coordinate efforts in the “Natural Economic 
Territory.” Some of the issues TRADP focuses on are tourism, transport, water supply, 
and investment, amongst additional concerns (Cotton 1998: 148-9).  
The Tumen River Area Development Project was extended for another 10 years in 
2005 and was renamed the Greater Tumen Initiative (GTI). The GTI has four member 
countries: China, Russia, the Republic of Korea (South Korea), and Mongolia. As typical 
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of North Korean international policy, North Korea elected to not participate. The 
signatories seek to deepen cooperation and development in the areas of trade and 
investment, tourism, transportation, energy, and the environment. 
 
5.2.4 Tigris-Euphrates River Basin 
The headwaters of the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers originate in eastern Turkey. 
The rivers run south through Syria and Iraq, spilling out to the Persian Gulf. As the 
hegemon of the basin, Turkey has maintained dominant control over the Tigris and 
Euphrates Rivers. Since the 1960s, Turkey has sought to utilize the Euphrates and Tigris 
rivers for its hydropower potential, increasing resource strain in an already scarce region. 
Turkey created the Southeastern Anatolia Development Project (GAP) to increase its 
hydroelectric capability. Under the GAP, a planned 22 dams would be built in southeast 
Turkey. 
 In order to receive donor funding for the project, Turkey had to guarantee a 
minimal water flow downstream. Commitments guaranteeing a certain amount of water 
discharge across Turkey’s borders expired once the first dams became operational. 
Turkey approached donors for additional funding, however, donors required a 
comprehensive commitment by Turkey regarding minimum water flow to the 
downstream states. Once Syria and Iraq rejected Turkey’s offer, Turkey began financing 
the GAP through domestic funds and unilaterally pursuing its water objective without 
consideration of its effects on the downstream states. Fruitless negotiations were held 
from 1970 to 1992 to reach an agreement between the three riparian neighbors. 
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The Tigris-Euphrates basin remains a conflictive region. Turkey has continually 
pursued its domestic objectives on the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers, disregarding requests 
from Syria and Iraq. Syria and Iraq have filed numerous claims resulting in fifteen rounds 
of talks, most of which have failed to produce an agreement (Zawahri 2006: 1044-9).  
 
5.2.5 Orontes River  
 The Orontes River, also called Asi (Turkish) or Nahr al-Asi (Arabic), is the only 
river that flows north in the Middle East. The Orontes River rises in Lebanon before 
flowing through Syria. The Orontes forms the Turkish-Syrian border for 31 km before 
continuing through Turkey and discharging into the Mediterranean Sea. All three 
riparians heavily rely upon the Orontes River for irrigation, domestic water supply and 
service industries. 
Syria and Lebanon have been able to reach an accord in managing their shared 
resource. Although the agreement never became operative, Syria and Lebanon 
established a joint committee to manage the annual water needs for the two riparians in 
1962. Nevertheless, the upstream and midstream riparian neighbors were able to reach an 
effective agreement in 1994. The Bilateral Agreement Concerning the Usage and 
Sharing of the Waters of the Al-Asi River (Orontes) between the Syrian Arab Republic 
and the Lebanese Republic allocated 80 MCM/year to Lebanon and 340 MCM (million 
cubic meters) per year to Syria. The agreement also laid the foundation to settle any 
future disputes between the two countries. 
 While Syria and Lebanon were able to reach a bilateral agreement, differing 
points of view regarding shared resource management have challenged basinwide 
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cooperation. Turkey treats the Orontes as a transboundary river, over which it has 
absolute authority of the portion that flows within its boundary. Conversely, Syria 
believes the common resource should be equally shared. Disagreement over agricultural 
water needs, planned irrigation projects (namely dams) and quality of downstream water 
challenges cooperation between Syria and Turkey regarding the Orontes River 
(Scheumann, Sagsen, and Tereci 2011). Additionally, Turkey and Syria share more than 
one international river. The two states have been unable to establish consistent water 
policies for all their shared rivers.  
 
5.3 Europe 
 From the latter half of the twentieth century through present day, the European 
Community and the European Union have heavily influenced water resource 
management. The EU Water Framework Directive (WFD), passed in 2000, provides a 
framework to European Union member states to adapt water policy to meet the objectives 
of the directive. The WFD calls for an integrated water management approach aimed at 
the preventive protection of shared resources in each basin. EU Environmental Policy 
views water resources as a heritage that must be protected to ensure the sustainable 
quality and quantity. The EU Water Framework Directive aims to coordinate water 
policies and get all European waters in “good condition” by 2015 (Dirksen 2002: 200).  
 
5.3.1 Danube River 
 Home to 80 million inhabitants, the Danube watershed traverses nineteen 
countries, more than any other river basin in the world. These countries include, 
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Hungary, Austria, Croatia, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Germany, Moldova, Serbia, Montenegro and Ukraine. 
Additionally, the Danube flows through small parts of Albania, Italy, Macedonia, Poland 
and Switzerland. The Danube River originates in Germany, flows through Central and 
Eastern Europe before emptying into the Black Sea via the Danube Delta in Ukraine and 
Romania. The 80 million inhabitants rely on the Danube for a variety of uses, including, 
drinking water, tourism, navigation, hydropower, irrigation, fishing and recreation.  
 With so many riparians sharing a watershed, disputes arose frequently over water 
development projects and their effects on the environment (Gerlak 2004: 1-2). One of the 
main issues in the Danube River Basin continues to be water quality. Pollution has been a 
contentious issue for many riparians along the course of the Danube.  
 The International Commission for the Protection of the Danube River (ICPDR) is 
the largest commission governing the Danube. It was established in accordance with The 
Convention on Cooperation for the Protection and Sustainable Use of the Danube River. 
Fourteen states signed the agreement in 1994: Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, Montenegro, the Republic of 
Moldova, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Ukraine, as well as the European 
Community. The ICPDR provides the principal framework for environmental governance 
and the platform for integrated river basin management in the Danube River Basin 
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5.3.2 Scheldt River 
 The Scheldt River, also known as Schelde, rises in northern France, traverses the 
Wallonia and Flanders Regions in Belgium and enters the Netherlands before discharging 
into the North Sea. The Scheldt River basin is densely populated and home to nearly 13 
million people who rely on the river for navigation and recreation as well as for their 
livelihood. Approximately 60% of the Scheldt River basin is used for agricultural 
purposes; additionally, 13% of the basin has been urbanized with multiple cities situated 
on the river.  
 The Scheldt has a history of conflict over pollution and water use. The basin is the 
most densely populated river in Europe. Additionally, with a rapidly urbanizing river and 
a large portion of the land used for agriculture, water quality has always been of primary 
concern. Consequently, the three co-riparians created an organization to equitably 
manage the Scheldt River Basin. The governments of France, Belgium, and the 
Netherlands signed the Treaty on the Protection of the Scheldt in 1994, which established 
the International Commission for the Protection of the Scheldt (ICPS). The objective of 
the ICPS is to integrate water management to multilaterally harmonize the obligations 
laid out by the EU Water Framework Objective. Moreover, the ICPS aims to monitor 
water quality and pollution in the basin and the effects it has on the environment to quell 
any future disputes over water quality (International Scheldt Commission).   
 
5.3.3 Elbe River 
 Some 25 million people in Germany, the Czech Republic, Austria and Poland 
share the Elbe. The Elbe originates in the Czech Republic and empties into the North Sea; 
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99% of the Elbe Basin lies in Germany and the Czech Republic. From the end of WWII 
to the fall of the Berlin Wall, there was hardly any cooperation between the (then) three 
main riparian states. Despite attempts by West Germany to foster cooperation, heavy 
pollution by the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia caused the Elbe to be 
one of the highest polluted rivers in Europe by the late 1980s. The possibility of 
international cooperation emerged with the end of the Cold War. Five days after the 
reunification of Germany, Germany and the Czech Republic signed the Convention on 
the International Commission for the Protection of the Elbe on 8 October 1990. The main 
objective of the commission was to reduce the pollution of the Elbe River in order to 
utilize the river for drinking water, while subsequently reducing the pollution of the 
North Sea from the Elbe discharge (Lindemann 2008: 133).  
 
5.3.4 Kogilnik River 
 The Kogilnik River is a bilateral transboundary river, flowing between Moldova 
and the Republic of Ukraine. The river basin area is split nearly in half between the two 
riparian neighbors, with 57.82% of the Kogilnik basin lying in Moldova, and the 
remaining 42.18% in Ukraine (Wolf 2002: 22). The governments of Moldova and 
Ukraine signed the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Moldova and 
the Government of Ukraine on Joint Use and Protection of Transboundary Waters in 
1994. This agreement not only covered the Kogilnik River, but also all groundwater and 
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5.3.5 Dnieper River 
 The Dnieper River is the third largest river in Europe, running 2,200 km before 
emptying into the Black Sea. The river is shared by Russia, Belarus and Ukraine. Ukraine 
is heavily dependent on the Dnieper River as a water resource: 22 million of the 33 
million people living in the Dnieper watershed reside in Ukraine. One of the major 
concerns of the Dnieper basin is water quality and the environment. Eight nuclear 
reactors, including the still-operating Chernobyl – lie within the Dnieper drainage system. 
The Chernobyl nuclear disaster of 1986, combined with poor waste treatment, intensively 
farmed areas, and additional spills of contaminated wastewater into the Dnieper have all 
led to high degradation of water quality in the watershed. While each riparian has 
developed interior departments or ministries aimed at preserving the Dnieper, the three 
neighbors have not established a basinwide institution or treaty. Nevertheless, the states 
have signed three bilateral treaties aimed to preserving the Dnieper River. Bilateral 
treaties between Russia and Belarus, Russia and Ukraine, and Belarus and Ukraine have 
been signed (United Nations and Economic Commission for Europe 2011).  
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Chapter 6: Discussion 
 To test the effect certain institutional mechanisms have on increasing the security 
in international river basins, this thesis examines thirteen river basins in Europe, Asia and 
Africa. A sample of three river basin organizations and two international rivers with 
treaties but no river basin organization is taken from each continent, with the exception of 
Africa. Due to limitations of data availability and the lack of river basins with a treaty 
only and no river basin organization in Africa, only three river basin organizations are 
examined. Both bilateral and multilateral basins are examined in order to compare 
institutional structure within different types of basins. While a number of states in these 
river basins have implemented multiple agreements throughout the past century, the most 
significant basinwide, or near basinwide, treaty is examined since it has the greatest 
impact on the basin.  
 This thesis is concerned with the effect river basin agreements have on 
international security within international river basins. International security is measured 
by using the International Water Event Database’s BAR scale. As defined by TFDD, the 
BAR scale ranges from -7, representing a declaration of war, to +7, representing 
voluntary unification into one state with a common purpose to act in cooperation. 
However, based on the nature of the international system, I do not anticipate this to occur. 
An international river basin with an average basinwide BAR scale score of at least +1 is 
considered to be a secure river basin. Whereas, a score -1 to -7 represents an unstable 
river basin. A basin scoring 0 is a neutral basin. For the purposes of this thesis, a 
difference in the BAR scale score of 0.500 or higher is considered significant.  
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This thesis tests for the effectiveness of four separate institutional design features 
in increasing international security. In the first section, each variable is first examined to 
understand the role it plays in international security in shared river basins. The BAR scale 
score for each river basin with the mechanism is averaged to find the mean of the score 
for each mechanism. Those basins that contain the design feature are compared to the 
river basins that do not include the design feature in their agreement. In the following 
section, each variable is controlled for three external variables to further analyze the 
effects the variables have on security within shared river basins.  
 
6.1 Institutional Structure 
 The four institutional structures this thesis studies were chosen based on the 
emphasis they are given in the examined literature. The capability of river organizations 
and treaties to adapt to changing environments, maintain compliance through 
enforcement and monitoring mechanisms, employ methods to manage disputes among 
riparian states and transmit data are presented in the literature as adding great value to the 
success of the RBO or treaty in achieving its objectives and maintaining cooperation. The 
purpose of the thesis is to apply these concepts to international security. Whether the 
theories supporting the importance of the four institutional mechanisms can be applied to 
international security is especially important in a world of climate change and decreasing 
freshwater supplies.  In a world of impending water wars, it is important to understand 




	   56	  
6.1.1 Adaptability 
  The hypothesis anticipated that the presence of an adaptability mechanism would 
increase the overall security of international river basins.  The needs and relationships 
between states are not static; they change over time as a result of many factors, such as 
economic prosperity, stability in the region, relations over other issue areas, etc. 
Consequently, it is important for parties to a treaty or organization to include methods 
with which they can amend the agreements to suit their needs as time changes. The 
inability to redefine or amend treaties poses the risk of creating an environment in which 
states party no longer approve or respect the treaty. If a party can no longer honor the 
treaty because it conflicts with other needs or policy initiatives, it may altogether desert 
the treaty because it cannot be altered. To measure adaptability of agreements, the 
amendment variable from the International Freshwater Treaties Database (IFTD) is used. 
IFTD considers a treaty to contain amendment ability if the text of the treaty mentions the 
possibility for amendment.  
 Six out of the thirteen basins examined possess an article that incorporates an 
amendment process into the treaty. The data demonstrates that a basin that incorporates 
adaptability mechanisms into its treaty is likely to have higher security within the river 
basin than those that do not. These river basins increased on average by 0.423 on the 
BAR scale. The basins with amendment abilities BAR scale averaged +2.366 after 
signing an agreement with the capacity to amend the treaty. 
 Conversely, basins that did not include an amendment provision saw a slight 
decrease in the Basins At Risks score. Before implementing the agreement, the basins 
that did not include an amendment article had an average BAR scale score of +1.645. 
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After signing the treaty, the score dropped to +1.537. The absence of a means to amend 
the river basin agreement impacts the security within the basin by -0.829 on the BAR 
scale.  
 The capacity to alter the agreement to suit the ever-evolving needs and political 
situations in river basins is key to increasing the overall stability and security in the basin. 
International river basins that are rigid in their agreements are less than ideal for 
maintaining cooperation in the basin. When a treaty has been outdated, it is easier for a 
treaty to be updated and revised when it has amendment mechanisms. 
  
6.1.2 Compliance: Monitoring and Enforcement 
 The nature of the international system gives states sovereignty over their territory 
and affairs. States are not obligated to engage in relations with other states. When states 
do elect to engage in relations with other states, they are not required to remain party to 
the treaty or convention. Nevertheless, states often adhere to the international treaties that 
they sign. A number of theories pose different explanations for why states tend to respect 
the agreements they sign.  
 For this thesis, compliance focuses on whether the inclusion of specific 
compliance mechanisms increases cooperation. When states sign an agreement, there is 
no overarching, international enforcement mechanisms forcing states to comply with the 
agreement or preventing states from defecting. One way to incentivize states to adhere to 
the agreements they make is to include mechanisms built into the treaty mandating 
compliance through enforcement mechanisms. Enforcement mechanisms can take the 
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form of monetary fines for trying to cheat or not comply with the provisions of the 
agreement.  
 Additionally, parties may opt to create monitoring mechanisms to ensure all 
parties are implementing the provisions outlined in the agreement and are not reporting 
false data and information. This thesis analyzes the inclusion of enforcement mechanisms 
and monitoring mechanisms as a method of encouraging compliance from the states 
party. The effect of compliance mechanisms on the security within the basin is measured 
by comparing basins that included enforcement provisions or monitoring provisions as 
well as basins that included both types of compliance mechanisms in their agreements. 
The International Freshwater Treaties Database codes an agreement as having an 
enforcement mechanism and monitoring mechanism if the agreement includes an article 
with the mechanism.  
 When the two compliance mechanisms are analyzed together, the security in the 
shared basins increased by nearly a half point after agreement implementation. However, 
contrary to the initial hypothesis, the BAR scale score of basins with any type of 
compliance mechanism was on average approximately a half point lower than basins that 
did not introduce mandated compliance to the agreement. Nevertheless, when the two 
compliance variables are analyzed separately, the data shows that the types of compliance 
mechanisms included in the agreement have different effects on the BAR scale within the 
river basins.  
Contrary to initial predictions, basins that included a monitoring mechanism saw a 
decrease in the BAR scale score after signing the agreement. On average, the BAR scale 
decreased by 0.717 points from before the agreement existed. Additionally, basins with a 
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monitoring mechanism scored significantly lower than basins that excluded it in the 
agreement.  Conversely, the hypothesis is upheld when the enforcement mechanism is 
isolated. River basins that included an enforcement mechanism saw a significant increase 
in the BAR score scale by an average of 1.609 points. Compared to basins enforcing the 
agreement, being an international river basin without an enforcement mechanism impacts 
the score by -0.415. 
The Indus Water Treaty is the only treaty of the agreements studied that included 
both an enforcement and a monitoring mechanism in the agreement. While the sample is 
not large enough to offer valid conclusions, it is interesting to note that the BAR scale 
score of the Indus River basin increased the most compared to the BAR average of basins 
that included only a monitoring mechanism. After implementing the agreements, the 
Indus BAR scale was 1.266 points higher than basins with only monitoring mechanisms. 
The Indus River and the Niger River basins are the only two cases that included an 
enforcement mechanism. The two basins had comparable levels of international basin 
security after implementing creating the river basin organization. 
 
6.1.3 Dispute Mechanism 
According to the literature, including a dispute mechanism is important to 
maintaining cooperation in international agreements. It provides the opportunity to 
peacefully resolve disagreements between parties to an agreement. It also reduces the 
uncertainty of the anarchy of the international system.  This thesis predicts that the 
inclusion of a dispute mechanism will increase the overall security of international river 
basins compared to basins that do not include a dispute mechanism in it agreement. 
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Six of the river basins that were examined mentioned a dispute mechanism: 
Danube, Indus, Mekong, Zambezi, Orange-Senqu and Niger. Contrary to the initial 
hypothesis, the river basins with a dispute mechanism did not significantly impact the 
security within the basins. These six cases on average scored 0.442 points lower than 
those basins without a way to resolve disputes.  
Collectively, the basins including this type of agreement characteristic saw, on 
average, a decrease in the BAR scale score after implementation of the agreement. Half 
of the river basins – the Niger, Danube and Indus – increased in security. Conversely, 
states that did not formalize a method to resolve disputes had an increase of nearly half a 
point in their score.  Generally, including a dispute mechanism in an international river 
agreement will not guarantee an increase in security within the river basin. The fact that 
dispute mechanisms were only present in river basin organizations may explain why the 
mechanism did not have an effect on the BAR scale score. The higher level of 
interdependence automatically creates an environment in which dispute must be resolved 
in order for the organization to function. Additionally, some of the RBOs that did not 
include dispute mechanisms may use ad hoc dispute mechanisms to resolve 
disagreements instead of having a formalized process.  
 
6.1.4 Data Exchange 
 An important factor in fostering cooperation and increasing security within 
international river basins is effective exchange of data between co-riparian states. 
Diligent and accurate data and information exchange is essential to properly implement 
programs and projects, such as building dams. Additionally, downstream states would not 
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be able to efficiently prepare for a potential flood if their upstream counterparts do not 
disclose accurate data regarding water quantity levels or any relevant information 
regarding the building of or malfunction of dams. The initial expectation predicted that 
the inclusion of a data exchange mechanism would increase the overall security of 
international river basins.  
 Nine of the cases studied included articles in their agreements that pertain to data 
and information exchange. Those basins that do not include the mechanism in the 
agreement are significantly less secure than the basins that do include the mechanism. 
River basins that include a data exchange mechanism in their agreement have a positive 
impact of 0.410 points on the BAR basin scale over basins that do not mandate data and 
information exchange between members. Data exchanged that is overseen by an 
organization or agreement increases the trust and transparency between member states, 
thus increasing security in the basin.  
 
6.2 Control Variables 
 Additional factors may affect the extent of the influence the four institutional 
design features have on the security in international river basins. Three control variables 
were tested for to further analyze the implications of the four explanatory variables under 
the three conditions. The variables are first controlled for whether the agreement created 
an institution or not. Certain design features may play a different role in the type of 
agreement it is included in. The participation level is also controlled for as a factor that 
may alter the behavior of the four institutional mechanisms. Finally, the state regime type 
is tested for to confirm or debunk if the democratic peace theory places a role in 
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international river basin security. Each explanatory variable is broken down into 
subsections categorized by whether the control variable is present. The two subsections’ 
BAR scale score are compared to analyze the influence the three control variables have.  
 
6.2.1 Treaty vs. Body 
 Of the thirteen river basins examined, the treaties of four of the basins did not 
establish a river basin organization: Dnieper, Kogilnik, Orontes and Tigris/Euphrates 
river basins. In general, the creation of a river basin organization has a positive effect on 
the general security of the basin. On average, river basins that created an organization 
increased their BAR scale score by 0.601 points after implementation of the agreement. 
Conversely, basins that signed an agreement that did not create an RBO had a substantial 
decrease in the BAR scale score after implementation; the average score decreased by 
0.809 points. Signing an agreement that does not create a river basin organization impacts 
the overall security of the basin by -1.409 points on the BAR scale score.   
None of the basins without an organization – Dnieper, Kogilnik, Orontes and 
Tigris/Euphrates – included an amendment article in their treaty. Out of the nine RBOs 
examined, one third of the cases did not write in an amendment process. The six basins 
that did include an amendment process had an average BAR scale score of +2.366. 
However, compared to river basins with RBOs that did not include an adaptability 
mechanism, the inclusion of an amendment process in a river basin organization was 
insignificant in increasing the security of the basin. By including an amendment process 
in RBOs, the score was barely higher (0.087) than excluding it. Nevertheless, the BAR 
scale score grew by 0.454 points for RBOs that did include the mechanism. While basins 
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that included the mechanism may not be more secure than those RBOs that did not 
include the variable, by incorporating the amendment process into the agreement, the 
basins were able to increase the security relative to the absence of the agreement in the 
basin. 
The data suggests that having a river basin organization with or without the 
mechanism over having an agreement significantly increases the security of the basin. 
Having a river basin without an institution and without adaptability impacts the BAR 
scale score by -1.386. The absence of the structure provided by institutions may decrease 
the likelihood for riparians to put in the effort to adapt their relations, and they may 
instead abandon the agreement altogether.  
When the two compliance variables are analyzed together, the results align with 
the initial predictions when they are controlled for institutionalization. Non-river basin 
organizations are significantly less secure than those basins with RBOs. The BAR scale 
score is negatively impacted by 2.277 points for non-institutionalized basins compared to 
their institutionalized counterparts. However, when the compliance mechanisms are 
analyzed separately, one mechanism supports the hypothesis, while the other is 
inconclusive.   
 Only two agreements from the sample included an enforcement mechanism to 
encourage compliance. Both agreements occurred in basins – Indus and Niger – that had 
a river basin organization. While being unable to compare with basins without an 
organization, it is important to note that the BAR scale remained on the positive side for 
the two river basins. The average of the two basins significantly increased by 1.609 
points after the states implemented agreements with enforcement mechanisms.  
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The second compliance mechanism under examination is present in both basins 
that created an organization and basins with only a treaty. The difference between 
agreements that included monitoring mechanisms is highly signification between basins 
with and without RBOs. On average, a basin with an enforcement mechanism without a 
river basin organization is negatively impacted by -1.852 points less than their RBO 
counterparts. Those basins that do not have a river basin organization have BAR scale 
score of -0.417 and are considered conflictive basins. 
 Similar to enforcement mechanisms, dispute mechanisms were only present in 
basins that had a river basin organization. The average BAR scale score remained on the 
positive side with an average score of +1.777. The river institution with the lowest score 
was the Mekong with a little less than +1.000. Four of the six basins had scores of +2.00 
or higher. Compared to other river basins with RBOs but no dispute mechanisms, those 
with dispute mechanisms had a lower BAR scale score. Nevertheless, both RBOs with 
and without a dispute mechanism had a significantly higher score than the basins without 
dispute mechanisms and without a river basin organization. 
Institutionalized cooperation creates a formal environment to manage relations 
between states. Institutionalization requires more time, effort, and money to maintain the 
agreement. The deeper cooperation and interconnectedness involves more frequent 
meetings and funding to operate the institutional structure itself, presenting more 
opportunities for disagreements over administrative issues to occur. Dispute mechanisms 
can cover administrative disagreements, in addition, to the traditional realist disputes that 
arise between states. Whereas treaties are more easily dismissed, states would naturally 
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be more interested in preserving the intricate organization that required so much effort to 
create. 
 Both institutionalized and non-institutionalized river basins incorporated data 
exchange in their agreements. However, the data significantly impacts the BAR scale 
score between river basins that have a governing organization and those that do not. 
Having an RBO impacts the data exchange score by +1.419. The structured interactions 
that riparian relations have under river basin organizations increases the reliability and 
trust in accurate data and information sharing between members. Consequently, the 
members are more apt to cooperate and participate in the exchange. Accurate data and 
information exchange can increase the efficiency of project implementation and decrease 
the concerns downstream states may have over water quantity and quality; thus, reducing 
or buffering the intensity or frequency of disputes.  
   
6.2.2 Participation 
 The number of states party to an agreement relative to the number of states within 
the entire basin may play a role in the effectiveness of treaties and the overall security 
within the basin. If not all sates are members of the governing basin organization or 
signatories to the treaty, they are not obligated to adhere to provisions outlined under the 
treaty. Moreover, they are not obligated under international law to cooperate or seek 
peaceful solutions with their co-riparian neighbors. Consequently, the possibility of an 
increase in conflict rises. Cases where not all states within a basin participated in the 
agreement were purposely chosen to compare whether basins with 100 percent 
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membership are more effective in international security than basins with partial 
participation. 
 Six of the thirteen cases examined have 100 percent of basin states party to the 
basin’s agreement: Kogilnik, Schedlt, Indus, Zambezi, Orange and Niger. The initial 
hypothesis predicted that basins with full participation of all states that share the river 
would be more secure than the basins in which only a portion of the states signed the 
agreement. The six basins that had full participation in the agreement had on average a 
half point increase in the BAR scale score after signing and implementing the agreement. 
Conversely, the seven basins that did not have full participation had on average a slight 
decrease in the basin BAR scale score. The basins with full participation had on average 
almost 0.300 points higher than those that did not have full participation.  
 The six basins that included adaptability mechanisms in the agreements were split 
on the number of states party to the agreement. The three African basins had full 
participation, whereas, the Elbe, Mekong and Danube had partial participation. The 
security in the three African river basins was sustainably higher than in the Elbe, 
Mekong, and Danube. Basins in which all riparian states of the basin participated and had 
adaptability mechanisms averaged 0.644 points higher than basins in which only a 
portion of riparian states participated.  
 Similar to the effect that the absence or presence of a river basin organization has 
on compliance, basins that had full participation of all riparian neighbors had more 
success in international security compared to the basins with only partial riparian 
participation in the agreement. In the comparisons of any type of compliance mechanism 
and the individual mechanisms, the basins that had full participation had more secure 
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basins than those that did not have full participation. Those that had full participation had 
on average 1.229 more points than the basins with partial participation. The hypothesis 
also holds up when the two compliance mechanisms are isolated.  
As expected, the inclusion of formal monitoring mechanisms in relations between 
riparian neighbors had a greater impact on the basins that have full participation of states 
than basins with only partial participation. By fostering compliance through monitoring 
states party’s implementation of the agreement and other basinwide provisions the BAR 
score is 1.205 higher than the basins that do not have full participation. 
The Indus and Niger basins are the only two of the thirteen cases examined which 
had an enforcement mechanism in place. In both instances, all riparian states of the basins 
participated in the Indus River Commission and Niger Basin Authority, respectively. 
While unable to compare with basins that have partial participation of states, it is 
important to note that relations in both basins remained, in general, peaceful and 
cooperative. In both cases, the BAR scale score increased after the agreement was 
implemented.  
 The results from the data regarding the presence of a dispute mechanism support 
the hypothesis that full participation of all states within the basin increases the overall 
security of the shared river basin. The basins in which all riparian states were party to the 
agreement increased the mean by nearly nine tenths of a point. Basins with partial 
membership remained at +1.033, while basins with full membership averaged a score of 
+2.143. Basinwide engagement in dispute resolution is likely to increase the security of 
the river basin. When only part of the basin is party to an agreement, only that part is able 
to structurally confront the disagreement. The co-riparians outside the agreement are not 
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obligated under an international treaty to resolve their disagreements, even if the other 
riparian is a party to the basin’s agreement. 
 Contrary to the other structural mechanisms, neither basinwide nor partial basin 
participation has a substantial effect on the BAR scale score in basins with formalized 
data exchange. The score difference between basins with full participation and those with 
partial was 0.147 points. Although the basins with 100 percent participation are only 
slightly more secure, it may be higher because data and information exchange will 
increase transparency and cooperation between states party in the basin. 
 
6.2.3 State Regime Type 
According to the Democratic Peace Theory, democracies cooperate more with 
other democracies than different governing authorities. The shared values and greater 
transparency increases the trust, and therefore, ease of reaching an agreement. This 
Democratic Peace Theory is controlled for to test whether the regime type of the states 
within a river basin has an implication for the agreements within a shared river basin. I 
anticipated that the type of governing authority would not adversely affect security within 
the basin, since cooperation is mutually beneficial to all parties regardless of regime type. 
The cases were split with six democratic river basins and seven anocratic river basins. 
However, the data shows that, in general, democracies tend to have more cooperative 
relations.  
The data suggests that, overall, democracies have a significantly higher BAR 
scale score (+2.562) than anocracies (+1.398). When separated from other anocratic 
basins, autocratic basins had a BAR scale score of +2.333, much higher than the 
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anocratic basins as a whole. Not only are democratic basins more secure in their inter-
state relations, these six river basins’ average BAR scale score increased significantly 
after signing an agreement. The score increased by 1.027 points. Whereas, anocratic 
basins had a substantial dip in their BAR score by -0.571 points. Additionally, it is 
interesting to note that RBOs were created in basins regardless of whether the basin is 
democratic or anocratic. 
While state regime type have significant correlation in the overall security of river 
basins, the security also varies significantly between democratic and anocratic basins that 
include an adaptability mechanism in their agreement. The democratic basin will be, on 
average, 1.355 points higher on the BAR scale than its anocratic counterparts. The 
difference between democratic and anocratic river basins could be the result of the higher 
level of transparency in democracies. 
The data also demonstrates a consistency for basins with compliance mechanisms. 
In general, democracies have a higher BAR score, by 0.761 points, than anocracies in 
basins with any type of compliance mechanisms. When isolated, the one compliance 
variables does not support the hypothesis. The difference is negligible between 
democracies and anocracies with enforcement mechanisms. On the other hand, 
anocracies with monitoring mechanisms have a significantly lower score – a difference of 
1.427 – than democracies. 
Unlike adaptability and enforcement mechanisms, the presence of dispute 
mechanisms in democratic river basins hardly differs from the anocratic river basins. 
Democratic river basins had an average score of +1.790, whereas, anocratic river basins 
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had an average score of +1.755. Whether a river basin incorporated a dispute mechanism 
is enough to maintain cooperation, regardless of state regime type. 
Similar to the presence of an adaptability mechanism, whether a river basin is 
democratic has a significant effect on river basins that formally exchange data and 
information. Democratic river basins that exchange data and information are much more 
secure than anocratic basins that include the mechanism. The difference between the two 
is nearly 1.500 points. The greater level of transparency democracies offer increases the 
likelihood and accuracy of data reporting.  
 
6.3 Summary 
This thesis tested for the impact certain design features have on security within 
international river basins. The initial hypothesis anticipated that the presence of the four 
mechanisms – adaptability, compliance, dispute and data exchange – would increase the 
security of international river basins. These basins would have a more secure river basin 
than those basins that did not include the mechanisms in their agreements. Overall, the 
findings for two of the four mechanisms uphold the hypothesis. International river basins 
that included amendment and data mechanisms had a significantly higher BAR scale 
score than the basins in which the mechanisms were absent from the agreements. The 
results showed hardly any difference between river basins that included a dispute 
mechanism and those that did not. The results suggest that river basins that included 
compliance mechanisms in the agreement had a lower BAR scale score than those that 
did not include the mechanism. However, when the two compliance mechanisms are 
analyzed separately, one variable supports the hypothesis, whereas the other does not. 
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The BAR scale score is significantly lower in basins that included monitoring 
mechanisms than those that did not. Conversely, basins that had an enforcement 
mechanism in the agreement had a substantially higher score than those that did not. The 
Democratic Peace Theory may explain why the monitoring BAR scores were lower than 
expected. The Mekong and Orontes river basins included monitoring mechanisms. They 
are both anocratic river basins with significantly low BAR scale scores – a difference of 
1.427 points compared to the democratic basins with monitoring mechanisms.  
The four explanatory variables were controlled for the presence of a river basin 
organization, the number of states participating in the agreement and the state regime 
type of the states party to the agreement. Overall, river basin organizations increase the 
security of river basins, compared to the basins that have only a treaty. The data supports 
the hypothesis that the presence of compliance and data exchange mechanisms in river 
basin organizations will incite more secure basins. The BAR scale score increases in both 
variables, including when the two compliance mechanisms are analyzed separately. It is 
interesting to note that only river basin organizations included enforcement mechanisms 
in the agreements. Additionally, adaptability and dispute mechanisms cannot be 
controlled for because they are only present in river basin organizations. 
The data shows that full participation of all riparian states in a river basin 
increases the overall security of the basin. When the variables are controlled for, three 
support the hypothesis. The river basins that had 100 percent participation of riparians 
and included amendment, compliance, or dispute mechanisms in the treaty had a higher 
BAR scale score than the basins that had only partial participation. The basins that had 
full participation and a data mechanism did have a slightly higher average score than the 
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basins with partial participation. However, the difference was not high enough to classify 
it as conclusive.  
The hypothesis anticipated that state regime type would not play a role in the 
security of international river basins. Nevertheless, the data shows that democratic river 
basins tend to be more secure than anocratic, upholding the Democratic Peace Theory. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
 Water security is a rising topic of concern for international security scholars. The 
increasing global population, coupled with climate change, leads to an increased strain on 
a diminishing resource. A growing population requires more water from a resource that is 
restricted in quantity. Moreover, the cyclical seasonal and annual changes in the water 
quantity of internationally shared rivers cause periods of low supply in areas of high 
demand. Strained basins are at greater risk for conflict that could escalate to armed 
conflict. The threat of impending water-wars has the potential to become a very real issue 
if states cannot cooperate over shared resources. Consequently, co-riparian states must 
collaborate to seek a solution to an important security issue.  
 This thesis sought to examine how international river agreements can be best 
crafted to promote the greatest level of cooperation and security in transboundary river 
basins. It analyzed a sample covering three large regions of the world and included 
varying types of agreements that covered an array of issue areas. A broad case selection 
offers a comprehensive analysis that can be applied to all types of river basins worldwide. 
The scope and number of international river agreements has increased in recent decades; 
therefore, it is important to understand the nature of all types of international river 
agreements.  
 Examining thirteen river basins across Africa, Europe and Asia, this thesis tested 
the hypothesis that the international river agreements that included specific institutional 
design features in the agreement would improve the security of the river basin. The 
hypothesis stated that the basins that created agreements incorporating adaptability, 
compliance, dispute and data mechanisms would be more secure than those with 
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agreements that did not include the design features. This thesis then controlled for three 
additional factors to further analyze the effects the agreements have on the thirteen cases. 
I anticipated that those basins that had established river basin organizations, those that 
had full participation of all states that shared the river or its tributaries would be more 
secure. Additionally, I anticipated that the state regime type of the members of the 
agreement would not affect the security of the river basin since cooperation over shared 
resources is mutually beneficial to all parties involved.  
The results show some slight inconsistencies with the expectations. The data from 
two of the four institutional mechanisms do not support the hypothesis that the inclusion 
will boost the security of international river basins. The inclusion of compliance 
mechanisms or dispute mechanisms did have a higher BAR scale score of the cases 
examined. In fact, the score was lower for the basins that included compliance 
mechanisms than those that did not. However, the data shows that the type of compliance 
mechanism impacts the security of the basin. The more peaceful basins included 
enforcement mechanisms, whereas, monitoring mechanisms appeared more often in 
basins with a significantly lower score. When creating an agreement to manage river, co-
riparian states should take into consideration the types of compliance mechanisms that 
would most benefit the specific basin.  
Dispute mechanisms, overall, did not impact the security of the basins examined. 
However, it is interesting to note that dispute mechanisms were only present in basins 
that established a river basin organization. According to the data, RBOs are, in general, 
more secure than the basins that signed an agreement without creating an organization. 
The higher level of cooperation necessary to establish and maintain an RBO may explain 
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why including a dispute clause did not increase the security of the basin. The member 
states are already prepared to settle disagreements and cooperate to ensure that the 
organization survives and thrives.  
The data for two institutional mechanisms did, nevertheless, uphold the 
predictions. The exclusion of amendment and data mechanisms negatively impacts the 
security of international river basins. Those basins that included the mechanisms had a 
significantly higher score than those that excluded the mechanisms. In particular, river 
agreements that included an amendment variable increased the security of the basin by 
over 0.800 points after the agreement was signed. Those agreements that included a data 
mechanism also increased after implementation, but not as significantly as the 
amendment variable. 
The four variables had slightly different outcomes when controlled for the three 
control variables, compared to the comprehensive analysis. Regardless of inclusion of the 
explanatory variables, river basins are more secure when a river basin organization is 
created. The basinwide security level is more likely to increase if the river basin 
organization includes the four design features studied. The RBOs that included 
mechanisms consistently had higher scores than the RBOs that excluded the mechanisms 
in their agreements. It is interesting to note that only river basin organizations included 
adaptability and dispute mechanisms in the agreements. These two mechanisms were not 
present in any non-RBO agreements. To gain a better understanding of the role of 
adaptability and dispute mechanisms, future research could expand the case selection to 
include non-RBO agreements that incorporated the two variables into the agreement. 
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The data supports the hypothesis that full participation will lead to higher levels 
of cooperation. When all states within a basin partake in the agreement, the security of 
the basins is likely to increase. River basins in which all co-riparian states participated in 
the agreement and included adaptability, compliance and dispute mechanisms had a 
higher average BAR scale score than those basins that did not have full participation. 
When all the states are included, each state is able to propose its own policy objectives 
and can voice its concerns. The members of the agreement can then shape the goals and 
provisions of the agreement to best accommodate all states, thus aligning basinwide 
objectives and increasing cooperation. Mandated data exchange did not significantly 
affect the security of basins with full participation, compared to those with partial 
participation. The score of basins in which all riparians participated was only slightly 
higher. The expectation of data exchange in any type of basin is likely to increase the 
security, regardless of how many members participate.  
Contrary to the initial expectations, state regime type plays a role in the security 
of international river basins. The Democratic Peace Theory is upheld in environmental 
security. International river basins with primarily democratic states party to the 
agreement were overall more secure in their intra-basin relations. The democratic basins 
that included adaptability, dispute and data mechanisms in the agreements had a higher 
score than those without the mechanisms. Interestingly, the inclusion of compliance 
mechanisms in democratic basins did not increase the security. The democratic basins are 
likely more able to maintain cooperation because they share the same values and visions 
of the basins. Democratic states are also used to the bureaucracy that international law 
entails, and are thus willing to support the process. Therefore, compliance mechanisms 
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are not essential in democratic basins to maintain cooperation. The anocratic basins that 
included enforcement mechanisms in the agreements had a significantly higher BAR 
scale score than those anocratic basins that did not have a means to enforce the 
international law. When creating an agreement in anocratic basins, policy makers should 
consider including an enforcement clause. However, monitoring mechanisms do not seem 
to increase security in anocratic river basins. It is important to further analyze the effects 
of compliance mechanisms in anocratic river basins to develop future river basin 
agreements.  
Overall, the data suggests that to maximize security in river basins, co-riparian 
states should establish a river basin organization that includes adaptability, compliance, 
dispute and data mechanisms. The RBO should also seek to include all states that share 
the river and its tributaries in order to increase cooperation within the basin. If some 
states are not included in the river basin organization, cooperation is likely to decrease 
since the states unilateral domestic policies may not be aligned with the organization’s 
goals for the basin that would be beneficial to the basin as a whole. Even though state 
regime type is an external factor that cannot be easily altered, the river basin organization 
is more likely to be successful if the member states are mostly democracies and not 
autocracies or isocracies.  
This research is intended to be used as a starting point to further explore the 
success of different structures and institutional design features of international river 
agreements. To further the findings, increasing the sample size within the three 
continents, as well as increasing the case sample to include all regions of the world could 
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expand the research in this thesis. Examining all regions of the world would provide a 
more accurate universal theory to apply to future international river agreements. 
The number of river basins with both enforcement and monitoring mechanisms in 
the agreement limited the sample. Expanding the sample of basins that included both 
types of compliance mechanisms in their treaties would provide a more accurate picture 
of the effects of the inclusion of both design features in agreements. Additionally, it 
would be important to further analyze the types of compliance mechanisms that are used 
in the agreements and which are the most effective. This thesis analyzed only two types 
of compliance mechanisms. However, there are a number of additional features to include 
in agreements. Exploring these additional variables would provide international policy 
makers with the necessary information to select the most effective tools to include in 
future agreements or amend current agreements to include the most appropriate 
mechanisms. 
It is interesting to note that the regions with high political tensions between the 
riparians seem to have the lowest security within international river basins: the 
Orontes/Asi (-0.417), Mekong (+0.933) and the Tigris (+0.003). These three river basins 
all lie in Asia. Additionally, all three river basins do not have 100 percent participation of 
riparians. Research analyzing the effect overall inter-state relations between co-riparian 
countries have on cooperation of international rivers would be helpful to understand the 
nature of environmental politics in conflictive regions. The four variables may play a 
different role in different regions of the world. Additionally, a further analysis of the 
effects the mechanisms have in different regions of the world would be beneficial to 
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understanding if different mechanisms play a different role in different regions of the 
world. 
The findings of this thesis are important for both policy makers and scholars. 
Policy makers can use the results while shaping future agreements and amending current 
ones to suit their goals. The findings contribute to the literature surrounding design 
features of international river institutions. However, further analysis would increase the 
understanding of the effects agreements have on environmental security.  
River basins across the world vary by the size, number of riparian states in the 
basin, climate of the region, state regime type of riparian states, amongst other external 
factors. The agreements co-riparian states create to govern the shared resource must be 
shaped to suit the unique factors of the basin. However, certain design features of the 
agreement seem to positively affect the security of the river basin. Policy makers should 
take these features into consideration when shaping future international river agreements.
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